Primal-dual distance bounds of linear codes with application to
  cryptography by Matsumoto, Ryutaroh et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
50
60
87
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
12
 Ju
n 2
00
6
1
Primal-dual distance bounds of linear codes with
application to cryptography
Ryutaroh Matsumoto, Member, IEEE, Kaoru Kurosawa, Member, IEEE, Toshiya Itoh, Nonmember, Toshimitsu
Konno, Nonmember, Tomohiko Uyematsu, Member, IEEE
Abstract— Let N(d, d⊥) denote the minimum length n of a
linear code C with d and d⊥, where d is the minimum Hamming
distance of C and d⊥ is the minimum Hamming distance of C⊥.
In this paper, we show a lower bound and an upper bound on
N(d, d⊥). Further, for small values of d and d⊥, we determine
N(d, d⊥) and give a generator matrix of the optimum linear
code. This problem is directly related to the design method of
cryptographic Boolean functions suggested by Kurosawa et al.
Index Terms— Boolean function, dual distance, linear code,
minimum distance
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental problems in coding theory is to find
the minimum length of linear codes for the given minimum
Hamming distance d and the given number of codewords K ,
where the length of a linear code means the length of the
codewords.
In this paper, we study a variant of this problem: find
the minimum length of linear codes C which achieves the
given minimum Hamming distance d and the given minimum
Hamming distance d⊥ of C⊥, where C⊥ denotes the dual code
of C. Note that the number of codewords K is replaced by the
minimum Hamming distance d⊥ of C⊥ in our new problem.
This problem is interesting not only theoretically but also
practically: it is directly related to the design of cryptographic
Boolean functions as follows.
Block ciphers must be secure against various attacks, in
particular against differential attacks [3] and linear attacks
[10]. The security of block ciphers is often studied by viewing
their S-boxes (or F functions) as a set of Boolean functions.
We say that a Boolean function f(x) satisfies (propagation
criteria) PC(ℓ) [12], [13] if f(x) + f(x + ∆) is uniformly
distributed for any ∆ with 1 ≤ wt(∆) ≤ l, where wt(∆)
denotes the Hamming weight of ∆.
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It is clear that PC(ℓ) is directly related to the security
against differential attacks because ∆ is the input difference
and f(x) + f(x + ∆) is the output difference of f . Also,
f(x) is a bent function [9, Chapter 14] if and only if f(x)
satisfies PC(n) [13], where a bent function has the largest
distance from the set of affine (linear) functions. Hence PC(n)
is directly related to the security against linear attacks. The
famous strict avalanche criterion (SAC), which was introduced
as a criterion of the security of S-boxes [14], is equivalent to
PC(1).
More generally, we say that f(x) satisfies (extended propa-
gation criteria) EPC(ℓ) of order k [12], [13] if f(x) satisfies
PC(ℓ) even if any k bits of x = (x1, · · · , xn) are fixed to
any constant bits. (We remark that many authors refer to EPC
as just PC, including [8].) For example, SAC(k), which is a
generalized version of SAC, is equivalent to EPC(1) of order
k. As shown above, EPC(ℓ) of order k is a more generalized
security notion of cryptographic Boolean functions.
Kurosawa et al. [8] gave the first construction method of
EPC(ℓ) of order k based on the Maiorana-McFarland con-
struction (see [7]). They showed that there exists an EPC(ℓ)
of order k function f(x1, · · · , xn) if there exists a linear code
C such that d = k + 1, d⊥ = ℓ + 1 and the length of C is
n/2, where d is the minimum Hamming distance of C and d⊥
is the minimum Hamming distance of C⊥. Carlet generalized
this construction to nonlinear codes [5].
We now ask, given k and ℓ, what is the minimum n for
which EPC(ℓ) of order k functions f(x1, · · · , xn) exist ? In
the design method of Kurosawa et al. [8], this is equivalent
to saying that, given d and d⊥, find the minimum length n
of a linear code C with d and d⊥. Note that this problem is
exactly the same as the one mentioned at the beginning of the
introduction.
More formally, let N(d, d⊥) denote the minimum length n
of a linear code C with d and d⊥, where d is the minimum
Hamming distance of C and d⊥ is the minimum Hamming
distance of C⊥. We then want to find N(d, d⊥) for given
d and d⊥. In this paper, we show lower bounds and upper
bounds on N(d, d⊥). Further, for small values of d and d⊥,
we determine N(d, d⊥) exactly and give a generator matrix
of the optimum linear code.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
introduce relevant concepts and notations. In Section 3, we
propose upper bounds on N(d, d⊥). In Section 4, we propose
lower bounds on N(d, d⊥), show true values of N(d, d⊥), and
compare the proposed bounds with the true values. In Section
5, concluding remarks are given.
2II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We use f to denote a Boolean function {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
and φ to denote a function {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, where m ≤ n.
We use x to denote (x1, · · · , xn), where xi is a binary variable.
Let · denote the inner product of two binary vectors over
GF (2). For a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality of A.
Let a linear [n,m, d] code denote a binary linear code C of
length n, dimension m and the minimum Hamming distance
at least d. The dual code C⊥ of a linear code C is defined as
C⊥ = {u | u · v = 0 for all v ∈ C} . The dual distance d⊥
of C is defined as the minimum Hamming distance of C⊥.
B. Resilient Functions
Definition 1: We say that φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is
an (n,m, k)-resilient function if φ(x1, · · · , xn) is uniformly
distributed even if any k variables xi1 , · · · , xik are fixed into
constants. That is,
Pr[φ(x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , ym) | xi1xi2 · · ·xik = α] = 2
−m
for any k positions i1 < · · · < ik, for any k-bit string
α ∈ {0, 1}k and for any fixed (y1, · · · , ym) ∈ {0, 1}m, where
the values xj (j 6∈ {i1, . . . , ik}) are chosen independently at
random.
C. EPC(ℓ) of order k
Define the derivative of f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} by
D∆f = f(x) + f(x+∆)
for ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n.
Definition 2: [12], [13] We say that a Boolean function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisfies EPC(ℓ) of order k if D∆f is k-
resilient for any ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n with 1 ≤ wt(∆) ≤ l. (We also
say that f is an EPC(ℓ) of order k function.)
Kurosawa et al. gave a general method to design EPC(ℓ)
of order k functions by using a linear code [8].
Proposition 3: Suppose that there exists a linear [n,m, k+
1] code C with the dual distance at least ℓ + 1. Then there
exists an EPC(ℓ) of order k function f : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}.
Remark 4: The construction of [8] is essentially quadratic
in nature with a non-quadratic ‘offset’ part. After [8], Carlet
[5] showed a construction which uses nonlinear Kerdock and
Preparata codes as an improvement. It gives non-quadratic
Boolean functions not just in their offset part.
Define N(d, d⊥) as the minimum n such that there exists
a linear [n,m, d] code C with the dual distance at least d⊥.
Then N(k+1, ℓ+1) is the minimum n such that there exists
a EPC(ℓ) of order k function f : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1} in the
design method of Kurosawa et al. We will consider the upper
and lower bounds on N(d, d⊥), and also determine the true
values of N(d, d⊥) for small d and d⊥.
III. UPPER BOUND
In this section, we show upper bounds on N(d, d⊥). The
first bound is based on a Gilbert-Varshamov type argument [9,
pp. 557–558].
Definition 5:
Sn,m = {C | C is an [n,m] linear code},
Sn,m(v) = {C ∈ Sn,m | C ∋ v},
S⊥n,m(v) = {C ∈ Sn,m | C
⊥ ∋ v}
Lemma 6: For a nonzero vector v ∈ GF (2)n, we have
|Sn,m(v)|
|Sn,m|
=
2m − 1
2n − 1
, (1)
|S⊥n,m(v)|
|Sn,m|
=
2n−m − 1
2n − 1
. (2)
Proof is given in Appendix I.
Theorem 7: There exists an [n,m, d] binary code with the
dual distance d⊥ if
2m − 1
2n − 1
d−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
+
2n−m − 1
2n − 1
d⊥−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
< 1.
N(d, d⊥) is upper bounded by the minimum n satisfying the
above inequality.
Proof: The required code exists iff
Sn,m 6=
⋃
1≤wt(v)≤d−1
Sn,m(v) ∪
⋃
1≤wt(v)≤d⊥−1
S⊥n,m(v).
The cardinality of the right hand side is less than or equal to∑
1≤wt(v)≤d−1
|Sn,m(v)|+
∑
1≤wt(v)≤d⊥−1
|S⊥n,m(v)| (3)
≤

2m − 1
2n − 1
d−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
+
2n−m − 1
2n − 1
d⊥−1∑
i=1
(
n
i
) |Sn,m|
by Lemma 6. Thus, if the assumption of the theorem is
satisfied, the required code exists.
We also introduce another upper bound.
Proposition 8:
N(d− 1, d⊥) ≤ N(d, d⊥)− 1 (for d ≥ 2), (4)
N(d, d⊥ − 1) ≤ N(d, d⊥)− 1 (for d⊥ ≥ 2). (5)
Proof: Let C be a linear code attaining N(d, d⊥), and
C′ be the punctured code of C. Then C′ has the minimum
distance at least d − 1 and the dual distance at least d⊥,
which proves Eq. (4). Equation (5) is proved by considering
the punctured code of C⊥.
IV. LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we give four lower bounds on N(d, d⊥). The
first two are immediate applications of the Griesmer bound
and a well-known fact of MDS codes. The third is based
on an improvement to the Hamming bound. The fourth is an
improvement to Brouwer’s bound [4] based on the solvability
of a system of linear inequalities [6].
3A. Bounds based on the Griesmer bound and the result in
MDS codes
Proposition 9 (Griesmer): [9, Section 17.§6] If there exists
an [n,m, d] linear code, then
n ≥ d+
m−1∑
i=1
⌈
d
2i
⌉
.
Theorem 10:
N(d, d⊥) ≥ min[n : 2n ≥ d+ d⊥+
min
m=1,...,n−1
{
m−1∑
i=1
⌈
d
2i
⌉
+
n−m−1∑
i=1
⌈
d⊥
2i
⌉}
] (6)
Proof: If there exists an [n,m, d] code with dual distance
d⊥, then by the Griesmer bound we have
2n ≥ d+ d⊥ +
m−1∑
i=1
⌈
d
2i
⌉
+
n−m−1∑
i=1
⌈
d⊥
2i
⌉
. (7)
Since N(d, d⊥) is the minimum n such that there exists a
linear code of length n, minimum distance d and dual distance
d⊥, 2N(d, d⊥) is lower bounded by the minimum of the right
hand side of Eq. (7) over possible n and m.
Remark 11: It is well-known that the simplex codes attain
the Griesmer bound. However, they do not attain Eq. (6).
The Singleton bound is a corollary to the Griesmer bound
and has a simpler expression. It states that if there exists an
[n,m, d] code then m ≤ n−d+1. When the code is binary and
d ≥ 3, it can be tightened to m ≤ n−d [11]. The first part of
the following result can be seen as a corollary to Theorem 10.
Theorem 12:
N(d, d⊥) ≥ d+ d⊥ − 2. (8)
When d ≥ 3 and d⊥ ≥ 3, we have1
N(d, d⊥) ≥ d+ d⊥. (9)
Proof: Adding m ≤ N(d, d⊥)− d+ 1 and N(d, d⊥)−
m ≤ N(d, d⊥) − d⊥ + 1 shows Eq. (8). A similar argument
shows Eq. (9).
B. Bound based on an improved Hamming bound
In this subsection, we will introduce an improvement to the
Hamming bound, and derive a lower bound on N(d, d⊥) as a
corollary.
Definition 13: For positive integers d and n, we define the
function ℓ(n, d) by
ℓ(n, d) =


(d−1)/2∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
for odd d,
d/2−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
+
(
n− 1
d/2− 1
)
for even d.
Discrete random variables X1, . . . , Xn are said to be d-wise
independent if
Pr[Xi1 = xi1 , . . . , Xid = xid ] =
d∏
j=1
Pr[Xij = xij ]
1This improvement was pointed out by an anonymous reviewer.
for all d-tuples of indices (i1, . . . , id) and all realizations (xi1 ,
. . . , xid) of random variables.
Lemma 14: [1, Proposition 6.4] Let X1, . . . , Xn be (d−1)-
wise independent nonconstant random variables that map the
sample space Ω to {0, 1}. Then we have |Ω| ≥ ℓ(n, d).
Theorem 15: For an [n,m, d] linear code C, we have
2n−m ≥ ℓ(n, d).
Proof: Let H be a parity check matrix for C, and hi be its
i-th column. Consider the sample space Ω = GF (2)n−m and
the random variable Xi that maps v ∈ Ω to the inner product
of v and hi. Since any (d − 1) columns in H are linearly
independent, the random variables X1, . . . , Xn are (d − 1)-
wise independent with the uniform probability distribution on
Ω. By Lemma 14, 2n−m = |Ω| ≥ ℓ(n, d).
Observe that Theorem 15 is an improvement to the Ham-
ming bound when d is even.
Corollary 16:
N(d, d⊥) ≥ min{n | n ≥ log2 ℓ(n, d) + log2 ℓ(n, d
⊥)}.
Proof: If there exists an [n,m, d] linear code with dual
distance d⊥, then by Theorem 15
2n−m · 2m ≥ ℓ(n, d) · ℓ(n, d⊥)
⇐⇒ n ≥ log2 ℓ(n, d) + log2 ℓ(n, d
⊥). (10)
Since N(d, d⊥) is the minimum n such that there exists a
linear code of length n, minimum distance d and dual distance
d⊥, N(d, d⊥) is lower bounded by the minimum of the right
hand side of Eq. (10) over possible n.
C. Bounds based on linear inequalities
For a linear code C, define
Aw = |{c ∈ C : wt(c) = w}|,
A′w = |{c ∈ C
⊥ : wt(c) = w}|.
We have [9, Section 5.§2]
A′w =
1
|C|
n∑
i=0
AiPw(i) =
1
|C|
(
n
w
)
+
1
|C|
n∑
i=1
AiPw(i),
where Pw(i) is the Krawtchouk polynomial defined by
Pw(i) =
w∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
i
j
)(
n− i
w − j
)
.
For w = 1, . . . , n, we must have A′w ≥ 0. When the code
C has minimum distance d, we have A1 = A2 = · · · =
Ad−1 = 0. We also have A′1 = · · · = A′d⊥−1 = 0 if C has
dual distance d⊥. Therefore, if there exists a linear code of
length n, minimum distance d and dual distance d⊥, then there
exists a solution Ad, . . . , An to the following system of linear
inequalities:

Ai ≥ 0 for i = d, . . . , n,∑n
i=dAiPw(i) = −
(
n
w
)
for w = 1, . . . , d⊥ − 1,∑n
i=dAiPw(i) ≥ −
(
n
w
)
for w = d⊥, . . . , n.
(11)
Theorem 17: [4] N(d, d⊥) is greater than or equal to the
minimum n such that there exists a solution to the above
system of linear inequalities.
4We will add other constraints to Eq. (11). Since we consider
linear codes, there must exist an integer solution (Ad, . . . , An)
with Ad + · · · + An = 2m − 1 for some nonnegative integer
m.
A binary linear code is said to be even if all codewords have
even weight. We call a code odd if it is not even. When the
code C is odd, then there is the same number of even weighted
codewords and odd weighted ones. Moreover, the dual code
C⊥ does not contain the codeword with all 1, otherwise C is
even. Therefore, if the code C is odd, then we have{ ∑
i:evenAi =
∑
i:oddAi,
A′n = 0.
(12)
When the code C is even, then the dual code C⊥ contains
the codeword with all 1, and we have A′i = A′n−i, because
there is one-to-one correspondence between codewords with
weight i and weight n− i by adding the all 1 codeword.
Furthermore, we have the following inequality [4] when C
is even:
4
∑
4|i
Ai ≥
n∑
i=0
Ai,
where 4|i denotes that 4 divides i. Summing up, the evenness
of C implies

Ai = 0, for i = 1, 3, 5, . . . ,
4
∑
4|iAi ≥
∑n
i=0Ai,
A′n = 1,
A′i = A
′
n−i.
(13)
By exchanging the role of C and C⊥, we see that the
oddness of C⊥ implies{ ∑
i:evenA
′
i =
∑
i:oddA
′
i,
An = 0.
(14)
and that the evenness of C⊥ implies

A′i = 0, for i = 1, 3, 5, . . . ,
4
∑
4|iA
′
i ≥
∑n
i=0A
′
i,
An = 1,
Ai = An−i.
(15)
When we estimate N(d, d⊥) and d is even, the code can
be either odd or even, and we search a solution for either
Eq. (12) or (13). When d is odd, the code is odd and we
search a solution for Eq. (12) only. The same rule applies to
d⊥.
Remark 18: We remark on the computational complexity
on the bound presented in this subsection. When we require
Ad, . . . , An to be integers, we have to solve an integer
programming problem for which there is no known polynomial
time algorithm in the number of variables [2, Section 11.8].
When we allow Ad, . . . , An to be any real numbers, we solve
a linear programming problem that can be solved in roughly
O((n − d)5) arithmetic operations [2, Section 9.3]. In both
case, it quickly becomes difficult to compute the lower bound
for large n.
D. Numerical Examples
In this subsection, we give numerical examples of the
derived bounds in Table I. An entry x in Table I means that
N(d, d⊥) ≥ x for the lower bounds, and N(d, d⊥) ≤ x for
the upper bound. True values of N(d, d⊥) are also listed,
which are obtained by exhaustive search. Generator matrices
of codes attaining N(d, d⊥) are listed in Appendix II. We
could not determine the true values of N(d, d⊥) by exhaustive
search with (d, d⊥) not listed in Table I. We remark that
N(2, δ) = N(δ, 2) = δ because the trivial [δ, 1, δ] code has
dual distance 2.
From Table I, we can make the following observations.
Lower bounds are increasing in order of Corollary 16, The-
orem 17, and the improvement of Theorem 17 in Sec. IV-C.
Theorems 10 and 12 give smaller lower bounds. The upper
bound in Theorem 7 is very loose for small values of d and
d⊥. This looseness seems to come from the fact that many
elements are counted several times in Eq. (3).
Additional constraints in Sec. IV-C give the true values
of N(d, d⊥) as a lower bound except for (d, d⊥) = (5, 5).
They also improve Theorem 17 in the parameters (d, d⊥) =
(5, 3), (5, 4), (6, 3), (6, 4), (6, 5), (6, 6). These improvements
significantly reduced the required time for exhaustive search.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the minimum length of lin-
ear codes with specified minimum Hamming distances and
dual distances, from which cryptographic Boolean functions
are constructed. We obtained an upper bound by a Gilbert-
Varshamov type argument, and lower bounds by applying the
Griesmer, the Hamming, and the linear programming bound.
The true values for the minimum length are also determined
by exhaustive search for certain range of parameters. These
lower bounds and true values are useful for estimating the
necessary input length of cryptographic Boolean functions for
given cryptographic strength. This paper also demonstrated
that the upper bound proposed herein is too loose, and it
remains an open problem to derive a tight upper bound.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Lemma 19: For nonzero vectors u, v ∈ GF (2)n, we have
|Sn,m(u)| = |Sn,m(v)|, (16)
|S⊥n,m(u)| = |Sn,n−m(u)|, (17)
|S⊥n,m(u)| = |S
⊥
n,m(v)|. (18)
Proof: We define the group GLn as the set of bijective
linear maps f on GF (2)n. In the following equation, Sn,m ∋
5TABLE I
TRUE VALUES AND ESTIMATES OF N(d, d⊥) BY THE DERIVED BOUNDS
d d⊥ true
value
lower bounds upper
bound
Thm. 12 Thm. 10 Cor. 16 Thm. 17
(con-
ven-
tional)
Sect. IV-C Thm. 7
3 3 6 6 5 6 6 6 17
4 3 7 7 6 7 7 7 21
4 4 8 8 7 8 8 8 25
5 3 11 8 7 9 10 11 24
5 4 13 9 8 11 11 13 29
5 5 16 10 11 14 14 14 34
6 3 12 9 8 10 11 12 28
6 4 14 10 9 12 12 14 33
6 5 17 11 12 15 15 17 38
6 6 18 10 13 16 16 18 42
7 3 14 10 9 12 14 14 31
7 4 15 11 10 14 15 15 37
8 3 15 11 10 14 15 15 35
8 4 16 12 11 15 16 16 40
C1 is a fixed linear code, and g is a fixed bijective linear map
on GF (2)n such that g(v) = u.
|Sn,m(u)|
= |{C ∈ Sn,m | C ∋ u}|
= |{f(C1) | f(C1) ∋ u, f ∈ GLn}|
= |{f(C1) | f(C1) ∋ g(v), f ∈ GLn}|
= |{g−1 ◦ f(C1) | g
−1 ◦ f(C1) ∋ v, f ∈ GLn}|
= |{f(C1) | f(C1) ∋ v, f ∈ GLn}|
= |Sn,m(v)|.
Equation (16) is proved.
By taking the dual code, we see that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between Sn,m and Sn,n−m, and we have
|S⊥n,m(u)|
= |{C ∈ Sn,m | C
⊥ ∋ u}|
= |{C ∈ Sn,n−m | C ∋ u}|
= |Sn,n−m(u)|,
which proves Eq. (17). Equation (18) is deduced from
Eqs. (16) and (17).
Proof of Lemma 6. Let B be the set of a pair of a nonzero
vector u and C ∈ Sn,m such that u ∈ C. For each C ∈ Sn,m,
there are 2m − 1 nonzero vectors u such that u ∈ C, and we
have |B| = (2m − 1)|Sn,m|.
For each nonzero vector u there are |Sn,m(u)| linear codes
C such that u ∈ C, and we have
|B| =
∑
0 6=u∈GF (2)n
|Sn,m(u)| = (2
n − 1)|Sn,m(v)|
by Eq. (16). Thus Eq. (1) is proved. Equation (2) follows from
Eqs. (17) and (1).
APPENDIX II
LINEAR CODES ATTAINING N(d, d⊥)
In this Appendix, we give the name or generator matrices
of linear codes attaining N(d, d⊥). Matrices are generator
matrices of linear codes attaining N(d, d⊥) unless otherwise
specified.
N(3, 3) = 6: Attained by the [6, 3, 3] shortened Hamming
code.
N(4, 3) = 7: Attained by the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code.
N(4, 4) = 8: Attained by the [8, 4, 4] extended Hamming code.
N(5, 3) = 11:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0


N(5, 4) = 13:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1


N(5, 5) = 16:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1


N(6, 3) = 12:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1


6N(6, 4) = 14: The generator matrix of its dual code is

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0


N(6, 5) = 17: The generator matrix of its dual code is

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1


N(6, 6) = 18:

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0


N(7, 3) = 14: Attained by the [14, 4, 7] punctured simplex
code.
N(7, 4) = 15: Attained by the [15, 5, 7] punctured first order
Reed-Muller code.
N(8, 3) = 15: Attained by the [15, 4, 8] simplex code.
N(8, 4) = 16: Attained by the [16, 5, 8] first order Reed-
Muller code.
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